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Wellenkamp v. Bank of America: A Victory for the
Consumer?
By David Greenclay Crane*

Few issues in real property law have provoked as much litigation
as the due-on clause.' Fewer still have resulted in such a disparity of
2
holdings, generalization being nearly impossible. In California, for
example, beginning with the landmark decision of Coast Bank v. Minderhout3 and continuing through the recent case of Wellenkamp v. Bank
ofAmerica,4 the law in this field has come practically ful circle, earlier

approvals of automatic enforcement of these clauses gradually giving
way to judicially-sponsored restrictions.5

The due-on clause originally was conceived of as a device to pro-

tect the lender's security in the event of sale or further encumbrance on

the subject property by the mortgagor. 6 It permits the lender to declare
* B.G.S., 1975, The University of Michigan. Member, Third Year Class.
1. "Due-on" is a generic term, characterizing both the "due-on-sale" and "due-onencumbrance" forms of acceleration clauses. The two provisions are not actually separate
clauses but rather identify events that trigger the lender's right to declare the balance of the
loan due and payable. See Tucker v. Lassen Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 12 Cal. 3d 629, 631 n.1, 526
P.2d 1169, 1170, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634 (1964). This Note adopts the generic terminology,
with reference to the distinct triggering event when appropriate.
A typical due-on clause reads as follows: "Should Trustor sell, convey, transfer, dispose
of or further encumber said property, or any part thereof, or any interest therein, or agree to
do so, without the written consent of Beneficiary being first obtained, then Beneficiary shall
have the right, at its option, to declare all sums secured hereby forthwith due and payable."
For further examples, see Note, Judicial Treatmentof the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Casefor
Adopting Standardsof Reasonablenessand Unconscionability,27 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1110
n.5 (1975).
2. Compare Malouffv. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo. 294,509 P.2d 1240
(1973) (lender's right to exercise due-on-sale clause in order to maintain its loan portfolio at
current rates recognized as legitimate interest) with Tucker v. Lassen Say. & Loan Ass'n, 12
Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974) (same interest expressly denied). Compare Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529 (Tenn. 1973) (automatic enforcement of the clause
allowed without regard to underlying purposes) with Nichols v. Ann Arbor Fed. Say. &
Loan Ass'n, 73 Mich. App. 163, 250 N.W.2d 804 (1977) (due-on-sale clause win not be
enforced unless found to be reasonable).
3. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), overruled in part, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
4. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
5. See notes 13-36 & accompanying text infra.
6. See Bonanno, Due on Sale andPrepayment Clauses in Real EstateFinancingin Cai-
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the entire balance of the loan due and payable upon such sale or encumbrance. In practice, however, the due-on clause has become a lever
for extracting waiver and assumption fees as well as for increasing the
interest rate on an existing mortgage to prevent assumption of the low
interest loan by a subsequent purchaser. 7 The lender may achieve this
objective either by insisting upon payment of the full balance and relending at current rates, or by agreeing instead to waive exercise of the
clause upon agreement by the purchaser to assume the loan at current
rates and pay appropriate assumption fees.
The due-on clause takes on increasing importance during periods
of rising interest rates. In states like California, where the average
turnover of homes is a very rapid seven years, 8 the due-on-sale clause
has become an extremely valuable device by which lenders continually
may adjust their loan portfolios up to current interest levels.
The competing viewpoints of lenders and borrowers are well established. Lenders argue that automatic enforcement of the due-onsale clause is necessary for protection from security impairment and the
risk of nonpayment by uncreditworthy purchasers. 9 More importantly,
lenders contend they are subjected to a double risk: if money is loaned
at a low interest rate and costs and rates subsequently rise, the lender is
bound by its loan contract and cannot increase the interest rate so long
as the borrower retains the security property. But, if the loan is made
at a high rate, and interest rates fall, the borrower may prepay the loan
by refinancing.' 0
On the other hand, borrowers contend that exercise of the due-onsale clause may reduce the amount for which the borrower could sell
the property. They suggest that in some cases enforcement could prevent any sale of the mortgaged property if the purchaser or mortgagor
did not wish to pay the current rate of interest."
Jormain Times ofFluctuatingInterest Rates-LegalIssues andAlternatives, 6 U.S.F. L. REV.
267 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Bonanno]; Valensi, The Due on Sale Clause-A Dissenting
Opinion, 45 L.A. BAR BULL. 121 (1970). See also Goddard, Non-Assignment Provisions in
Land Contracts, 31 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1932). For a thorough discussion of the nature and
development of the due-on clause, see Bonanno, supra, at 271-91.
7. See Bonanno, supra note 6, at 275; Valensi, The Due on Sale Clause-A Dissenting
Opinion, 45 L.A. BAR BULL. 121 (1970).
8. Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 1978, Pt. III, at 11, col. 1; cf. Valensi, The Due on Sale
Clause-A DissentingOpinion, 45 L.A. BAR BULL. 121, 123 (1970) (average life of home loan
in Southern California is four to five years). See also Struck, The Average Life ofa SingleFamily Mortgage, 7 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. no. 6, at 15 (1974) (average life of

mortgage is eight to twelve years on national basis).
9. See notes 59-64 & accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 77-102 & accompanying text infra.
11. See Note, Judicial Treatment of the Due-on-Sale Clause: The Casefor Adopting
Standards of Reasonablenessand Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1109, 1113 (1975); see

notes 56-58 & accompanying text infra.
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This Note evaluates the decision in Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America,'2 in which the California Supreme Court considered the enforceability of a due-on-sale clause upon the outright sale of mortgaged
property. After an examination of those cases that preceded Wellenkamp through the California courts, the Note criticizes the opinion
itself before concluding with a discussion of expected after-effects and
future problems sure to arise in the area of real estate finance.

Pre-Wellenkamp Cases
Prior to 1964, California courts had interpreted Civil Code section
71113 to invalidate "not only absolute restraints on alienation, but also
restraints partial as to persons or duration."' 4 The California Supreme
Court's decision in CoastBank v. Minderhout'5 thus represented a radical break with the common law tradition.' 6 In a unanimous opinion
written by Chief Justice Traynor, the court found that section 711 forbade only unreasonable restraints against alienation.' 7 Whether a dueon-sale clause was reasonable was to be determined by analyzing its

necessity in preventing impairment to the lender's security.18 Coast
Bank held that it was not unreasonable for the lender to condition its
continued extension of credit upon the borrowers' retention of their interest in the property securing the debt.' 9 That is, the lender could au-

tomatically accelerate its loan upon sale of the property by the
borrower.
Two appellate decisions extended the CoastBank interpretation of
section 711 before the supreme court had the opportunity to consider
the due-on clause again. In Hellbaum v. Lytton Savings & Loan Association,20 the court of appeal held that the lender's automatic right to
12. 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
13. CAL. CIV. CODE § 711 (West 1954) provides: "Conditions restraining alienation,
when repugnant to the interest created, are void."
14. La Sala v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 878, 489 P.2d 1113, 1121-22,
97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 857-58 (1971).
15. 61 Cal. 2d 311, 392 P.2d 265, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505 (1964), overruled in part, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
16. See La Sala v. American Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 5 Cal. 3d 864, 878, 489 P.2d 1113,
1122, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849, 858 (1971).
17. 61 Cal. 2d at 316-17, 392 P.2d 265, 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. 505, 508, overruled in part,
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
18. Id. at 316-17, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508.
19. Id. at 317, 392 P.2d at 268, 38 Cal. Rptr. at 508. Much of the discussion surrounding Coast Bank has focused on whether the court actually validated automatic enforcement
of the due-on-sale clause or simply adopted something approaching a reasonableness standard. See Volkmer, The Application of the Restraintson AlienationDoctrine to Real Property
Security Interests,58 IowA L. REV. 747, 774 (1973).
20. 274 Cal. App. 2d 456, 79 Cal. Rptr. 9 (1969), disapproved,Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
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accelerate upon sale, even when combined with its right to impose a
prepayment penalty, did not constitute an unlawful restraint upon
alienation. Three months later, the court of appeal in Cherry v. Home
Savings & Loan Association2 held that a lender had the right to accelerate automatically upon sale to take advantage of rising interest rates
as well as to protect its interest in the responsibility and reliability of
the original borrower.
With its 1971 decision in La Sala v. American Savings & Loan Association,2 2 the supreme court began to limit those situations in which a
lender might automatically enforce the due-on clause. La Sala involved a threatened acceleration upon placement of a second deed of
trust on the mortgagor's property. Justice Tobriner, writing for a 6-1
majority, first noted that the rationale for the holdings in Coast Bank,
Hellbaum, and Cherry was based on situations involving a vendor-borrower who, by transferring the property, no longer retained any interest
in the property.2 3 This fact, absent in La Sala, sufficiently threatened
the lender's security to justify automatic enforcement of the due-onsale clause.2 4 In contrast, the court pointed out that a junior encumbrance does not terminate the borrower's interest in the property. Although a junior lien may create the possibility of future foreclosure,
that risk can not justify endowing the lender with an absolute right to
accelerate.2 5 The court therefore held that, unlike the due-on-sale
clause, the due-on-encumbrance clause was not automatically enforceable, and could be exercised only when reasonably necessary to protect
26
the lender's security.
In listing those situations in which the institution of a junior lien
might endanger the lender's security sufficiently to justify acceleration,
21. 276 Cal. App. 2d 574, 81 Cal. Rptr. 135, disapproved, Wellenkamp v. Bank of
America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). The court in Cherry
accepted the lender's argument that protection in the form of an exercisable due-on-sale
clause is necessary to protect them from overexposure: "When interest rates are high, a
lender runs the risk they will drop and that the borrower will refinance his debt elsewhere at
a lower rate and pay off the loan, leaving the lender with money to loan but at a less
favorable interest rate. On the other hand, when money is loaned at low interest, the lender
risks losing the benefit of a later increase in rates. As one protection against the foregoing
contingency, a due-on-sale clause is employed permitting acceleration of the due date by the
lender so that he may take advantage of rising interest rates in the event his borrower transfers the security. This is merely one example of ways taken to minimize risks by sensible
lenders." Id. at 579, 81 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
22. 5 Cal. 3d 864, 489 P.2d 1113, 97 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1971).
23. Id. at 879-80, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
24. "[W]e have distinguished the due-on-sale from the due-on-encumbrance clauses
• . . [and conclude] that the lender may insist upon the automatic performance of the dueon-sale clause because such a provision is necessary to the lender's security." Id. at 883, 489
P.2d at 1126, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
25. Id. at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
26. Id. at 882, 489 P.2d at 1125, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
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the court clearly implied that the borrower's remaining interest, equitable or legal, was the key element in each case. If the borrower were
left with so little interest in the property that there was little or no incentive to prevent waste or deterioration, the lender would be justified
in exercising its right to accelerate.2 7 Additionally, the court rejected
the lender's argument that enforcement was justified for the purpose of

upgrading its loan portfolio, but suggested in dicta that this argument
28

might be more persuasive when applied to the sale of property.
Three years later, in Tucker v. Lassen Savings & Loan Association,29 the supreme court confronted the question of whether automatic
enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon the sale of property by in-

stallment contract 30 constituted an unlawful restraint on alienation.

Relying on the principles announced in La Sala, the court propounded
a refined rule: "To the degree that enforcement of the clause would

result in an increased quantum of actual restraint on alienation in the
particular case, a greater justification for such enforcement from the
standpoint of the lender's legitimate interests will be required in order
to warrant enforcement." 3' Applying this rule to the facts of Tucker,
the court held that enforcement of a due-on-sale clause upon sale by

installment contract resulted in a great degree of restraint, requiring a
was necessary to protect the
significant showing that acceleration
32
lender's legitimate interests.
27. "We recognize, however, as defendants point out, that instances may occur when
the institution of a second lien does endanger the security of the first lien. In some cases the
giving of a possessory security interest, e.g., a conveyance to a mortgagee in possession,
would pose the same dangers of waste and depreciation as would an outright sale. In other
cases a second lien may be employed as a guise to effect a sale of the property. In still others
a bona fide second loan may still leave the borrower with little or no equity in the property."
Id. at 881, 489 P.2d at 1124, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
28. "This argument may be appealing as applied to a sale of the property. The borrower in such sales generally receives cash sufficient to pay off his obligation. To permit the
lender to accelerate ensures that all buyers of property must finance at the current interest
rate, and that none obtain an advantage because of the fortuitous fact that his seller originally purchased during a period of low interest. Acceleration upon sale of the property, in
other words, does not seriously restrict alienation because the sale terms can, and usually
will, provide for payment of the prior trust deed.
[But], a restraint on alienation cannot be found reasonable merely because it is commercially beneficial to the restrainor. Otherwise one could justify any restraint on alienation
upon the ground that the lender could exact a valuable consideration in return for its waiver,
and that sensible lenders find such devices profitable." id. at 880-81 n.17, 489 P.2d at 112324, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
29. 12 Cal. 3d 629, 526 P.2d 1169, 116 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1974).
30. In such a contract the purchaser gets immediate possession of the property while
the seller retains legal title until the full purchase price is paid. See generally J. HETLAND,
CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS 100 (1970).
31. 12 Cal. 3d at 636, 526 P.2d at 1173, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
32. Id. at 637-39, 526 P.2d at 1174-75, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638-39. "Such legitimate inter-
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More importantly, the dicta in Tucker set the stage for Wellenkamp. After defining outright sales as all transactions "wherein the
33
seller receivesfullpayment from and transfers legal title to the buyer,
the court distinguished installment sales, asserting that outright sales
suffer little if any restraint because the vendor normally receives
enough money from the sale to pay off the note. 34 Moreover, the court
pointed out that, unlike outright sales, the vendor in an installment sale
generally receives only a small down payment and retains legal title,
35
thus reserving a considerable interest in maintaining the property.
The vendor in an outright sale has no comparable interest. The court,
as in La Sala, also rejected the lender's interest in maintaining its portfolio at current rates as a justification for the restraint, but explicitly left
unanswered the validity of this argument when applied to outright
sales.

36

Hence in Tucker, as in La Sala, the court juxtaposed outright sales
with installment sales (or in La Sala, junior encumbrances) to demonstrate the relative differences in restraint and justification that ensue
from acceleration in the latter situations. Consequently, future borrowers were presented with the dilemma of showing that, despite this distinction, outright sales also result in sufficient restraint to require
justification by the lender. Against this background, the California
Supreme Court considered the facts of Wellenkamp.
Wellenkamp v. Bank of America
In July, 1973, the Mans purchased a home in Riverside County,
financed by a loan from Bank of America in the amount of $19,100.
The loan, bearing interest at eight percent per annum, was evidenced
by a promissory note secured by a deed of trust containing the standard
due-on clause. Cynthia Wellenkamp purchased the property in July of
1975, paying the Mans their equity, and agreeing with them to assume
the note. Wellenkamp gave prompt notice of the purchase to Bank of
America and attempted to make payments on the loan. The bank returned the check and notified her that it would exercise its right to acests include not only that of preserving the security from waste or depreciation but also that
of guarding against what has been termed the 'moral risks' of having to resort to the security
upon default." Id. at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639 (citations omitted).
33. Id. at 634 n.6, 526 P.2d at 1172, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 636 (emphasis added).
34. Id. at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
35. Id. at 638, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638. The court pointed out that, since
the incentive to prevent damage or waste declines as the vendor's equitable interest diminishes, lenders would be justified in enforcing the clause as soon as the vendor's entire equitable interest had passed to the purchaser. The same rationale serves to reduce the actual
restraint as the vendor's equity is discharged. Id. at 639 n.9, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr.
at 639 (1974).
36. Id. at 639 n.10, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
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celerate unless she assumed the loan at an interest rate of nine and onequarter percent. When Wellenkamp refused to accede to this demand,
the bank instituted foreclosure proceedings. Wellenkamp filed suit to
enjoin the foreclosure action and sought a declaration that exercise of
the due-on-sale clause, without a showing that the bank's security had
beem impaired as a result of the sale, constituted an unlawful restraint
on alienation.
The trial court, after granting a preliminary injunction restraining
the foreclosure sale, sustained the bank's demurrer to the complaint on
the ground that automatic enforcement was valid under California
law.3 7 After that decision was affirmed by the court of appeal, Wellenkamp was granted a hearing before the supreme court.
As stated at the outset of the opinion, the issue was whether enforcement of a due-on clause contained in a deed of trust securing real
property constitutes an unreasonable restraint on alienation upon the
outright sale of that property.38 In a 6-1 decision, the court held that
the due-on clause cannot be enforced upon an outright sale unless the
lender can demonstrate that enforcement is reasonably necessary to
protect against impairment of its security or the risk of default. As a
result, Hellbaum and Cherry were disapproved, and Coast Bank was
overruled to the extent that it was inconsistent.3 9 The court, however,
gave the decision only a limited effect, rendering it inapplicable to
lenders who, on or before September 25, 1978, either enforced the
clause, resulting in sale by foreclosure or discharge of the debt, or
waived enforcement in return for an assumption agreement with the
40
buyer.
The court began its discussion with a summary of California law
on restraints on alienation before launching into an analysis of the issue. Justice Manuel, writing for the majority, first analyzed the quantum of restraint, explaining that only in the event of actual restraint
must the lender advance arguments in favor ofjustification for enforcement. After finding significant restraint was posed by enforcement of
37. 21 Cal. 3d at 946-47, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 639. The parties filed a
stipulation for deferring foreclosure in April 1976 whereby the defendant agreed to refrain
from taking further action to foreclose during the pendency of the appeal and plaintiff
agreed to pay defendant the amount of the monthly payment on the Mans' loan. Id. at 947
n.2, 582 P.2d at 972, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
38. Id. at 946, 582 P.2d at 971-72, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 380-81. In fact, there were essentially two issues in the case: whether the due-on-sale clause was automatically enforceable
in an outright sale, and if not, under what circumstances would it be enforceable.
39. It may be argued that Coast Bank is not contrary to the holding in Wellenkamp.
See note 19 supra.
40. 21 Cal. 3d at 954,582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386. See notes 110-15 & accompanying text infra.
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the clause, the court dismissed the justifications set forth by the bank
and held the exercise of the clause to be unlawful.
Existence of Restraint
Justice Manuel acknowledged that dicta in Tucker and La Sala
suggested little if any restraint resulted from acceleration after an outright sale. 4 1 In those cases, however, the term "outright sale" was restricted to transactions wherein the seller received full payment from
the purchaser (an "all cash to seller" transaction), usually through new
financing arranged by the buyer. That being the case, little restraint is
receives funds sufficient to disinvolved because the seller normally
42
charge the balance of the loan.
By redefining "outright sale" to include any sale by the borrower
wherein legal title is transferred, 43 the majority cleared the difficult hurdle of relying on the tests set forth in La Sala and Tucker while simultaneously distinguishing their damaging dicta. Outright sales, as
redefined, involve several types of financing arrangements not restricted to the "all cash to seller" method, including the "all-inclusive"
deed of trust and a deed of trust "carried back" by the vendor.44
When financing is easily available and existing rates are lower
than on the vendor's existing deed of trust, all buyers will attempt to
arrange an "all cash to seller" arrangement. Because the seller will pay
off the balance of the existing loan, no inhibitory restraint is exerted by
the due-on-sale clause. When money is tight or interest rates are high,
so that current levels of interest exceed the rate of the seller's note, the
buyer will seek to arrange a "cash to loan" transaction, paying the
seller's equity in the property and either assuming or taking "subject
to" the existing deed of trust. This allows the purchaser to capitalize on
the seller's low rate mortgage.
The latter situation, which qualifies as an outright sale under the
expanded definition, may be restrained if the lender is unwilling to permit assumption and elects to enforce the due-on-sale clause.
"[T]ransfer of the property may be prohibited entirely, because the
41. 21 Cal. 3d at 949, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
44. Id. at 950 n.5, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
Assume a buyer wishes to pay $110,000 for real property with an existing $75,000 encumbrance by giving $10,000 cash, assuming the existing $75,000 debt and encumbrance,
and giving a note and deed of trust for $25,000. Instead of a $75,000 assumption and a
"carried-back" $25,000 second, the buyer may give a $100,000 note secured by an "all-inclusive" or "wrap-around" deed of trust, ie., a second deed of trust that obligates the seller to
continue payment of the existing $75,000 senior encumbrance and obligates the buyer to pay
the $100,000 to the seller. See generally J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED
TRANSACTIONS 45-50 (1970).
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buyer will be unable to substitute a new loan for the loan being called

due, and the seller will not receive an amount. . sufficient to discharge that loan . . . . 45 Even if the lender waives acceleration in
return for assumption at the current rate, there is a restraint on alienation because the purchaser may demand that the sale price be reduced
to compensate for increased interest costs. "The seller would then be
forced to choose between lowering the purchase price and absorbing

the loss with the resulting reduction in his equity interest, or refusing to
In either event, the result in terms of a
go through with the sale at all. '46
is clear."

restraint on alienation
In his dissent, Justice Clark protested that the majority's opinion
not only misread La Sala and Tucker,47 but also created new restraints
of its own, harming owners of unencumbered property and drying up
mortgage funds formerly available to the next generation of borrowers. 48 He conceded that, in the tight money situation,,sketched by the
45. 21 Cal. 3d at 950, 582 P.2d at 974, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 383 (citation omitted).
46. Id. at 950-51, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384 (footnote omitted).
47. "The majority opinion now proposes to abandon what Coast Bank, La Sala and
Tucker have taught us. Having recognized the due-on clause in junior encumbrances and
installment sales to constitute unreasonable restraints only because they were deemed to
require striking a different balance from that in an outright sale, the majority opinion leaps
to the conclusion that a due-on clause in an outright sale is unenforceable, thus obliterating
our prior distinction." Id. at 955, 582 P.2d at 978, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387. Justice Clark did
not comment on the effect of redefining "outright sale." See text accompanying notes 41-44
supra.
48. 21 Cal. 3d at 956-57, 582 P.2d at 978-79, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 387-88.
Saddled with short-term liabilities and long-term assets, savings and loan associations
sell their mortgages in the secondary market to generate cash for new loans. To do so,
California lenders must compete with others nationwide, their mortgages being discounted
to provide a profit to the purchaser.
The secondary mortgage market is of major importance to California. Professor Pratt
has observed that 36% of the single-family residential deeds of trust in the western United
States are held by lenders outside the region. Pratt Report, The Due on Sale Clause in
California and Federally Chartered Savings and Loan Associations 24 (1976) (on file with
The HastingsLaw Journal). The observation has also been made that, "'[gliven a choice
between a mortgage with a due on sale clause and on [sic] one without it, both at the same
contract rate, a purchaser in the secondary market would select the one with the due on sale
clause. Stated another way, the rate must be higher on the mortgage without the clause than
on the one with it in order to interest the purchaser....'" Advisory Opinion of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board at 33, Schott v. Mission Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. CIV-75366 WMB (C.D. Cal. 1975) (citation omitted).
If maturities of California loans are lengthened as a result of Wellenkamp, the California loan may become an inferior product of questionable salability on the national market.
For example, an 8%, 25-year mortgage that is selling at 98 would yield 8.36% if it were
anticipated that its effective maturity is 8 years, but its yield is reduced by 12 basis points to
8.24 if its effective maturity were anticipated to increase to 20 years because the due on sale
clause is excluded. Looked at another way, to keep the yield at 8.36, the price would drop
from 98 to 97.
This yield differential does not, however, account for the income foregone by not turn-
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majority, homeowners face a more difficult market in which to sell their
properties. Clark maintained, however, that in an outright sale no increased restraint follows from either exercise of the clause or waiver in
return for assumption at current rates because all prospective buyers
and sellers are faced with the same market situation, and thus are similarly affected. 49 That is, all owners of property, encumbered or not,
must adjust their sale price equally or even forego a sale if current rates
are prohibitive and the lender is unwilling to waive his right to accelerate or increase the rate. 50 Thus, "[t]here is . . .no increased restraint
on alienation beyond that inherent in the economic conditions postu'5
lated by the majority." '
The net result of the majority opinion, according to Clark, is to
grant owners of encumbered property a competitive advantage over
owners of unencumbered property:
Because [the] seller has a marketable, sought-after asset in the form
of a low-interest transferable loan-something he never bargained
for-he can ask for and expect to get additional considerations from
his buyer. And the buyer may also look forward to the same advantage on resale. The loan has thus become not a restraint on aliena52
tion but a factor making salable what before could not be sold.
Notwithstanding the accuracy of his conclusion, Justice Clark
made the crucial error of comparing dissimilar situations when measuring the restraint imposed by the due-on-sale clause. The judgment as
to whether a contractual clause is a restraint on alienation can be made
only if the clause alone is the restraining force. Consequently, the
proper method for making such a determination simply should be to
compare two situations, one with the alleged restraint, the other without, all other factors remaining the same. Thus, as in a scientific analysis, the suspected variable is isolated.
Although the courts in La Sala and Tucker appreciated the necesing over the investor's money into a higher yielding instrument in the eighth year as opposed
to waiting until the twentieth year. Also, the market expectations embodied in the price of
98 must incorporate a level as opposed to a fluctuating mortgage rate forecast. It also does
not account for the potentially higher risk mentioned above if a credit check on the assuming party is now allowed. For these reasons, the 12 basis points differential in the example
above is only a minimum differential required in the contract rate of assumable as compared
to nonassumable mortgages in order to interest investors in the former. See id.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board has concluded that elimination of the
due-on-sale clause will impair the salability of California loans, or cause them to be sold at
reduced prices. Id. at 34. The Board also concluded, as apparently Justice Clark did, that as
a result of the impaired salability of loans, the flow of home funds into California will be
reduced. d.
49. 21 Cal. 3d at 956-57, 582 P.2d at 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 957, 582 P.2d at 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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sity of making a comparison to determine the existence of a restraint,
both unnecessarily complicated the issue by relating unlike situations.
In La Sala, the court chose to contrast the restraint involved in a dueon-encumbrance setting with that in an outright sale; 53 a more exact
comparison would have resulted from comparing the situation in which
a junior encumbrance is placed on a home encumbered by a deed of
trust containing a due-on-encumbrance clause to one in which the new
encumbrance is placed on a home encumbered by a deed of trust not
containing a due-on-encumbrance clause. Had the court done so, its
decision would have remained the same but supported by the reason
that enforcement would require the borrower either to refinance the
accelerated note at a higher rate or forego the new encumbrance altogether, placing him or her at a distinct disadvantage to the comparison
borrower.
Similarly, the court in Tucker contrasted the restraint imposed by
a due-on-sale clause in an installment sale with that in an outright
sale.54 A comparison of situations different only in the inclusion or
noninclusion of a due-on-sale clause would have yielded the same result, but again for the reason that the plaintiff was placed at a disadvantage to his or her otherwise equal counterpart.
In the case of an outright sale, the analysis described above illustrates the restraint imposed by enforcement of the due-on-sale clause.
Assume there are two homes, equally valued and equally encumbered
by deeds of trust bearing interest at eight percent per annum. Home A,
however, is saddled with a due-on-sale clause while home B is not.
Current rates are ten and three-fourths percent per annum. When both
homes are put up for sale, home A is placed at an obvious disadvantage
to home B, due entirely to the due-on-sale clause. Homeowner A will
have to reduce the sale price to compete with homeowner B. The resulting difference in price is the economic equivalent of the restraint on
alienation.
Instead of juxtaposing an encumbered home containing a due-onsale clause with an encumbered home lacking such a clause, Justice
Clark chose to introduce unnecessary variables by comparing an encumbered property to an unencumbered property. 55 Hence, he not
only eliminated the alleged restraint (the due-on-sale clause), but the
entire loan as well. The effect was to skew the results of his demonstration, notwithstanding the veracity of his conclusion that encumbered
properties are now more valuable than unencumbered properties.
Additionally, despite the fact that the majority concentrated on the
seller's loss of advantage through exercise of the clause, a comparison
53.
54.
55.

5 Cal. 3d at 880, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859.
12 Cal. 3d at 637, 526 P.2d at 1174, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 638.
21 Cal. 3d at 957, 582 P.2d at 979, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
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of situations differing only in the existence or nonexistence of a due-onsale clause was inherent in its analysis. The conclusion that a vendor
will lose the advantage of selling a low interest mortgage through exercise of the due-on-sale clause is pregnant with a similar conclusion that
he or she is at a disadvantage to a seller of encumbered property not
constrained by the same clause. The distinction is admittedly subtle yet
important for the purpose of dispelling the mistaken notion that the
clause was ruled invalid because it operated to revoke the seller's advantage.
Extent of Restraint
Although the concept of quantum of restraint was formally introduced in Tucker, its origin may be traced to the holding in Coast Bank
that only unreasonable restraints are unlawful. Bearing heavily on the
unreasonableness of a restraint is the actual amount of restraint imposed.
What, then, is the quantum of restraint in an outright sale, installment sale, or junior encumbrance situation? As the term "quantum"
suggests, it should be subject to quantitative analysis. Also, consistent
with that discussed earlier, the quantum should measure the actual disadvantage due solely to enforcement of the due-on clause.
The quantum of restraint in both outright and installment sales
therefore should be equal to the dollar difference between what the
seller could obtain for his or her property when subject to the clause
and what he or she could obtain when not so constrained, ie., the loss
in equity. Similarly, the quantum of restraint in a junior encumbrance
situation is the increase in interest the borrower must pay when forced
to refinance the accelerated note at prevailing rates. The quantum of
restraint is not, however, as the Wellenkamp majority suggested, equal
to the loss that results from the borrower's decision to forego the sale or
junior encumbrance. 56 Prohibition of the sale or encumbrance involves
an unnecesssary variable-the borrower's mental processes-that
57
should not be computed for the purpose of measuring restraint.
In both the due-on-sale and due-on-encumbrance situations, substantial restraint is evident when a loan has a long remaining life. In an
outright or installment sale, assuming all else is equal, the purchaser
loses the opportunity to lock in a low rate loan for a long term, and
will, as a result, demand a considerable discount from the seller. When
the loan is near maturity, however, little if any discount could be de56. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
57. Indeed, the prospective purchaser of a home may agree to purchase despite the
nonassumability of an existing loan simply because he or she wants that home. As a result,
the majority's nonquantification of the restraint may lead to a restraint in some cases and
not others.
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manded as the purchaser faces the imminent need to refinance. In the
junior encumbrance case, the cost of interest at a higher rate (and
therefore the restraint), due to the forced refinancing of the accelerated
deed of trust, would be substantial if the original loan had a long remaining life. But if the prior deed was near maturity, the cost would be
inconsequential.
In each of these situations, notwithstanding the actual quantum of
restraint, the seller/borrower may, for whatever reason, decide against
consummating the transaction. Accordingly, what is in reality a minimal restraint could become, through the language of the court, one of
great magnitude.5 8 Because Wellenkamfp has placed outright sales
within the confines of the balancing test announced in Tucker, and because the quantum of restraint is balanced against the degree of justification necessary to enforce the clause, future courts and litigants
should take care to gather an accurate measure of the actual restraint
imposed in each case.
Justification
Having determined that exercise of the due-on-sale clause in an
outright sale results in a substantial restraint on alienation, the court
turned its attention to the second part of the Tucker test, justification
for enforcement. The court conceded that lenders may exercise the
due-on-sale clause to protect interests pertaining to preservation of the
security from waste and the "moral risks" of having to resort to the
security upon default.5 9 The court concluded, however, that the mere
fact of sale does not in itself warrant automatic enforcement of the
clause. 60 The court gave three reasons for its conclusion: First, the
mere possibility that a purchaser may be uncreditworthy or wasteful
does not justify automatic enforcement; second, because outright sales,
as redefined, may involve secondary financing by the vendor, the seller
could retain an equity interest in the property, normally a sufficient
incentive to prevent waste or default; third, the lender's interest in
maintaining its loan portfolio 6at1 current rates does not justify enforcement, automatic or otherwise.
The first two of the foregoing propositions are an extension of Justice Tobriner's opinion in La Sala.62 Although some properties may be
58. See Bonanno, supranote 6, at 276 n.33: "In many cases, often as a matter of principle, the seller would adamantly refuse to sell for what he considered a 'loss' (i.e., a price less
than what he paid, without any allowance for depreciation), with the consequent failure of
the deal . .. ."
59. 21 Cal. 3d at 951, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384.
60. Id. at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
61. Id. at 951-53, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
62. See notes 22-28 & accompanying text supra.
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sold to uncreditworthy or wasteful purchasers, just as many, and perhaps more, are sold to persons of at least the same caliber as the vendor. Furthermore, a large number of properties are sold via vendorfinanced transactions, leaving the seller with an equity position. If the
legitimate purpose of the due-on-sale clause is to protect lender security, as the majority claims, then the risk of default or waste does not
justify endowing the lender with an absolute right to accelerate. 63 The
majority concluded that some circumstances may arise in which the
legitimate security interests of the lender may justify enforcement;
64
however, no examples were given.
The court's rejection of the lender's interest in maintaining its loan
portfolio at current rates follows similar holdings in La Sala and Tucker.65 Justice Manuel recognized that lenders face increasing costs of
doing business and are paying higher rates to depositors for the use of
their savings. Nonetheless, in the court's view, exercise of the due-onsale clause to protect against business risk does not further the purpose
for which it was legitimately designed, namely to protect against impairment of the lender's security. 66 In addition, the majority stated that
the risks of an inflationary economy are inherent in every transaction,
and are not unforseeable to or unforseen by lenders, who should and
do project these risks in determining the interest rate when making
loans. If, however, "these projections. . . prove to be inaccurate...
it would be unjust to place the burden of the lender's mistaken economic projections on property owners. . through. . . enforcement of
the due-on clause ....
In its arguments before the court, Bank of America based its defense of the loan portfolio as justification on three propositions: First,
the availability of the due-on-sale clause during periods of rising interest rates simply offsets the borrower's right to refinance when rates de63. See note 25 & accompanying text supra.
64. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. In his dissent, Justice
Clark argued that the majority had cited no authority for its conclusions, and again misapplied the principles set forth in Tucker. He also relied on the dicta of La Sala and Tucker
suggesting that, since vendors usually do not retain an interest in the event of an outright
sale, automatic enforcement is justified. Justice Clark, however, did not make reference to
the expanded definition of outright sale delivered by the majority, nor did he address the
issue of portfolio adjustment as justification. Id. at 957-58, 582 P.2d at 979-80, 148 Cal.
Rptr. at 388-89. Justice Clark then took aim at the court's interference with contractual
relations between private parties: "We err.., in failing to recognize that lenders and borrowers, owners and prospective owners, should be allowed to run their own affairs with
minimal governmental intrusion-particularly from this branch." Id. at 958, 582 P.2d at
980, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 389.
65. See notes 28, 36 & accompanying text supra.
66. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385. See note 24 & accompanying text supra.
67. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
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cline; second, fixed rate mortgages offer consumers an attractive

alternative to other forms of lending; and third, in fixed rate due-onsale transactions the lender makes the loan based on the assumption
68
that it will either be repaid or adjusted within seven to twelve years

the lender does not bargain for full payupon sale of the home, ie.,
69
ment only upon maturity.

The plaintiff responded that the borrower is in no way "free" to
refinance because prepayment penalties and new loan initiation fees
provide a substantial deterrent to refinancing for the sole purpose of
obtaining a lower interest rate.70 Furthermore, plaintiff claimed that

variable rate mortgages and other options provide lenders with a fair
and more sensible means of adjusting their portfolios. In addition, the
lender will receive exactly what it bargained for once the clause is rendered unenforceable: payments for a fixed period of time at a fixed
rate. 7 1 Finally, plaintiff asserted that the legitimate purpose of the
clause is to protect the security of the lender; loan portfolios are not

of "security" and therefore are not a justification
within the definition
72
for enforcement.
Notwithstanding the California Supreme Court's reluctance to ac-

cept the loan portfolio argument as a legitimate justification for enforcement, it is probably the most important and realistic argument put
forth by the lenders, particularly in residential lending. In practice,
rapidly rising home values 73 and anti-deficiency statutes 74 have com-

bined to render the creditworthiness of the purchaser a somewhat less
68. See note 8 & accompanying text supra.
69. Respondent's Brief in Court of Appeal at 44-48, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America,
21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
70. Brief of Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (Kipperman) at 25, Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978). See notes 76-78 &
accompanying text infra.
71. BriefofAmicus Curiae in Support of Appellant (Kipperman) at 32, Wellenkamp v.
Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
72. Petition for Hearing at 29-30, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582
P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978).
73. The median sales price of new private one-family houses in the western United
States more than doubled from 1971 to 1977. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1978 at 800 (99th ann. ed. 1978).
74. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 580b (West 1976) provides in part: "No deficiency judgment shall lie in any event after any sale of real property for failure of the purchaser to
complete his contract of sale, or under a deed of trust, or mortgage, given to the vendor to
secure payment of the balance of the purchase price of real property, or under a deed of
trust, or mortgage, on a dwelling for not more than four families given to a lender to secure
repayment of a loan which was in fact used to pay all or part of the purchase price of such
dwelling occupied, entirely or in part, by the purchaser." See generally J. HETLAND, CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE SECURED TRANSACTIONS 265-322 (1970). Section 580b effectively
bars deficiency judgments on allproperties where the vendor has carried back a portion of
the purchase price and on properties for not more than four families where a third party
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important issue because the lender often will be limited to relying
solely on the security in the event of default. 75 Waste may pose a problem occasionally, but, as the court pointed out, purchasers often put
down large down payments, thereby creating the incentive to preserve
the property. 76 Even if the down payment is minimal, the presumption
must be that the purchaser would not buy property simply to allow it to
deteriorate.
Moreover, there is merit to the argument favoring portfolio adjustment as justification for enforcement. California Civil Code section
2954.9 requires state-chartered lending institutions to permit owners of
single-family, owner-occupied dwellings to prepay loans made on or
after January 1, 1976, upon payment of a maximum of six months advance interest on the amount prepaid during the first five years after the
making of the loan and without any charge thereafter. 7 7 Thus, the borrower can refinance anytime after the first five years and pay only loan
initiation fees. 78 The effect is to reduce the average yield on the
lender has provided a portion of the purchase price. See notes 126-28 & accompanying text

4infa.

75. See Bonanno, supra note 6, at 289.
76. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 975-76, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384-85.
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2954.9 (West Supp. 1979). Under federal regulations, borrowers
at federal savings and loan associations may prepay up to 20% of their loan in a 12-month
period without penalty. The maximum penalty for excess prepayment is six months' advance interest on the amount prepaid. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-12(b) (1978).
78. The downward fluctuation required to make refinancing profitable to the mortgagor depends (loan fees and expenses aside) on three factors: the contract interest rate, the
remaining term to maturity on the original loan, and the prepayment charge. Assume, for
example, an original loan having a contract interest rate of 8.5%, an original term of 25
years, and a charge for prepayment prior to maturity of six months advance interest on the
amount prepaid less 20% of the original principal loan balance. At the end of five years, the
borrower would break even on refinancing if interest rates dropped from 8.5% to 8.06%; any
drop below 8.06% would represent a net reduction in financing expenses and thus would
make refinancing profitable:
Refinancing at end of year 5
$27,836.31
Loan balance due
Prepayment fee = (outstanding balance less 20% of original balance) x monthly interest x six months ($27,836.31-$6,000) X [.085+12] x 6 = $928.04
Total amount to be refinanced-27,826.31 + $928.04 = $28,754.35.
Interest rate required to finance $28,754.35 with a monthly payment of $241.57 and a maturity of 20 years = 8.06%.
At the end of ten years, the borrower would break even on refinancing if interest rates
dropped from 8.5% to 7.94%; any drop below 7.94% would represent a net reduction in
financing expenses and thus make refinancing profitable:
Refinancing at end of 10 years-(calculation sequence same as above, rate required =
7.94%).
Loan initiation fees are generally I to I % of the loan value. Interview with Edward S.
Washburn, Legal Counsel to Great Western Savings and Loan Association, Oakland, California (Feb. 12, 1979).
One commentator has argued that despite the advantage borrowers may have in being
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lender's portfolio.
As financial intermediaries, lenders accept money deposited or
loaned to them and reloan these same funds at higher rates. Virtually

all of the funds which savings and loan associations use for lending are
committed for a relatively short duration, the great majority maturing
in less than two years. 79 On the other hand, the average maturity on

loans made by associations has been estimated by the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board at 28.4 years for new homes and 26.6 years for existing homes.80 This phenomenon of lending long while borrowing
short presents little difficulty when interest rates remain stable. The

lender makes a profit on the spread between yields.
Stable rates of interest, however, are a thing of the past. The aver-

age cost of funds to federal savings and loan associations rose 50% from
1965 to 1976, while their average yield on mortgage portfolios lagged
behind, increasing 34%81 Indeed, the gross yield on the spread declined substantially over that period.8 2 As a result, after operating ex-

penses, federal savings and loan associations actually lost money on
mortgage portfolios in four of the twelve years spanning 1965 to 1976.83
The bulk of the industry's net income was derived from other sources,
able to refinance, the courts should consider "borrower inertia"; many may not want to go
through the time-consuming process of refinancing even if to their advantage. See Note,
JudicialTreatment of the Due on Sale Clause: The CaseforAdopting StandardsofReasonableness and Unconscionability, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1109, 1126 (1975).
79. See Zabrenski, Changes in S&L Savings Account Structure: April-September 1976,
10 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. no. 1, at 22 (1977).
80. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES
1978 at 801 (99th ann. ed. 1978).
81. StatisticalSeries, I1 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. no. 9, at 35-36 (1978); StatisticalSeries, 7 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. no. 4, at 89-90 (1974).
82. StatisticalSeries, I1 FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD J. no. 9, at 35-36 (1978). It
has been pointed out that the average net margin of profit per $100 of mortgages was only
$.21 per annum for the years 1965-73 in the Western United States. Pratt Report, The Due
on Sale Clause in California and Federally Chartered Savings and Loan Associations, Table
5 (1976) (on file with The HastingsLaw Journal).
83. Pratt Report, The Due on Sale Clause in California and Federally Chartered Savings and Loan Associations, Table 5 (1976) (on file with The HastingsLaw Journal); Trend
Sheet Analysis, Fed. Home Loan Bank of San Francisco, Sept. 30, 1973 and Dec. 1, 1976;
Combined FinancialStatements, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1965 at 86; 1966 at 47;
1967 at 40; 1968 at 40; 1969 at 40.
More important for this discussion is the effect of rising interest rates on fixed rate loans
in lender portfolios. The following chart demonstrates the result of locking in a fixed rate
loan at prevailing rates in 1965. Within three years the mortgage became an unprofitable
item:
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84
including securities and loan fees.
The foregoing illustrates that due-on-sale clauses provide lenders
with a method by which they may transfer some of the risk of rising
costs to borrowers. As consideration for this right, the borrower retains
the flexibility to refinance as rates decline, and, according to lenders,
receives a reduced rate. Nonetheless, the courts in Wellenkamp, Tucker, and La Sala consistently dismissed the contention that portfolio
adjustment was a legitimate justification for enforcement. Each court
agreed with Justice Tobriner in La Sala that "a restraint on alienation
cannot be found reasonable merely because it is commercially beneficial to the restrainor. '' 85 Furthermore, the majority in Wellenkamp accepted plaintiff's argument that the variable rate mortgage is a more
attractive alternative for the purpose of adjusting the yield on loan
portfolios.86
The courts' acceptance of this argument may be traced to a misunderstanding of the realities of mortgage lending. Although enforcement of the due-on clause may, in some cases, produce harsh results, its
availability to lenders actually operates to benefit the great majority of
borrowers. Fixed rate loans containing due-on-sale clauses are often
Interest Income
Per $100 of

Average Cost
of Funds Plus

Net Income Per

Year

Mtgs.

Operating

$100 Mtgs.

1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976

$ 6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37
6.37

$ 6.10
6.33
6.41
6.31
6.47
6.92
6.83
6.75
7.01
7.68
7.86
7.89

$27
.04
-. 04
.06
-. 10
-. 55
-. 46
-. 38
-. 64
-1.31
-1.49
-1.52

Total

$76.44

$82.56

$-6.12

Id

Note also that operating costs per $100 of mortgages actually declined over the 12 year
period, despite the inflationary trend of the era. Id.
84. CombinedFinancialStatements, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 1970 (p.40); 1971

(p.38 ); 1972 (p.50); 1973 (p.50); 1974 (p.50); 1975 (p.50).
85.

5 Cal. 3d at 880 n. 17, 489 P.2d at 1123, 97 Cal. Rptr. at 859. See note 28 & accom-

panying text supra.
86.

Apparently the court was either unaware of or unconcerned with the fact that, at

the time of the ruling, federally chartered savings and loan associations were prohibited
from making variable-rate loans on homes. See San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 15, 1978, at
1.
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the most advantageous form of financing to certain homebuyers, especially as rates continue to rise. Indeed, the Wellenkamp decision may

have the effect of providing a small measure of relief to a number of
present and potential homeowners at a great expense to all future bor87
rowers.
In addition to fixed rate loans with due-on-sale clauses, there are

three primary methods available to lenders for lending money adjusted
for the risk of increasing costs. They can increase the interest rate on
new fixed rate loans to provide a cushion for the risk of future cost
increases as well as balance those loans still outstanding at below-market rates. In addition, lenders can utilize variable interest rate mort-

gages (VRMs) in which interest is adjusted based upon a
predetermined formula. 88 Finally, they can make loans with short maturities and balloon payments in which the monthly payments of principal and interest are based upon normal twenty to thirty year
amortization schedules, but the entire unpaid principal balance is due
at the end of some lesser period, such as five or ten years. 89
Each method provides an alternative to standard fixed rate mort-

gages, the relative advantages and disadvantages varying with the borrower's personal situation and with general economic conditions. For
example, the "balloon payment" mortgage provides for termination as
87. Because home prices have soared since many loans were made, see note 73 supra,
prospective purchasers will have to borrow thousands of dollars elsewhere in order to make
up the purchase price. For example, if a house purchased a few years ago for $50,000 is for
sale today at $100,000, with an assumable $40,000 first deed of trust, the buyer must still
come up with $60,000 before taking over the existing loan. He or she must compare the cost
of borrowing a large part of that from another lender, perhaps through a second deed of
trust at a higher rate, with that he or she would pay through refinancing the entire purchase
with a first deed of trust. The calculation is a function of rates and the ratio of existing debt
to the total amount to be financed. See Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 1978, Pt. III, at 11, col.
I, at 13, col. 3.
88. VRMs issued by state-chartered lenders are primarily regulated by CAL. CIV. CODE
§ 1916.5 (West Supp. 1979) which provides in part:
"(2) The rate of interest shall change not more often than once during any semiannual
period, and at least six months shall elapse between any two such changes.
(3) The change in the interest rate shall not exceed one-fourth of 1 percent in any
semiannual period, and shall not result in a rate more than 2.5 percentage points greater
than the rate for the first loan payment due after the closing of the loan.
(4) The rate of interest shall not change during the first semiannual period.
(5) The borrower is permitted to prepay the loan in whole or in part without a
prepayment charge within 90 days of notification of any increase in the rate of interest."
The 10 largest VRM issuers in California had issued 241,000 VRMs as of Dec. 31, 1978,
comprising 41% of their portfolios. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 22, 1979, at 24, col. 3. Federally-chartered savings and loan associations were granted approval to issue VRMs effective
Jan. 1, 1979. San Francisco Chronicle, Dec. 15, 1978, at 1.
89. For an excellent summary of new trends in real estate financing, see Cowan &
Foley, New Trends in ResidentialMortgageFinancing,in REAL ESTATE FINANCING-TODAY
AND TOMORROW 120 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cowan & Foley].
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of a predetermined date. If the borrower sells the home before that
date no problem arises. But if the borrower still owns the property
when the balloon is due, the balance must be paid off regardless of
current financial or personal conditions. If money is tight or the borrower's credit is strained, refinancing could prove to be a hardship in
the form of higher rates or an inability to obtain credit. On the other
hand, if rates have declined, the borrower, with satisfactory credit, may
obtain a reduction in cost.90
In contrast, the standard mortgage, such as that in Wellenkamp,
presents no risk of premature termination. The duration of the loan
coincides with the borrower's ownership. The borrower is secure from
rising rates, but may refinance (subject to prepayment penalties) when
rates decline.
Similarly, if the lender chooses to cushion the risk of increasing
costs by increasing rates, the borrower ends up paying "interest insurance" for the loss of the lender's right to accelerate upon sale. 9' The
cushioned loan is a reasonable choice for borrowers who plan to sell
before maturity and expect rates to increase over the interim. If they
do increase, the insurance has been well worth the cost. If they decrease, the borrower has received nothing for this added expense.
For those who plan to keep their residence until maturity the cushioned loan results in a significant cost. The more attractive alternative
is the standard fixed rate mortgage containing a due-on-sale clause.
The lender has its insurance in the form of an acceleration clause while
the borrower gets a reduced rate as consideration. Moreover, the borrower can refinance at any time after five years without penalty, reap92
ing the benefits of lower rates.
Variable rate mortgages offer a more complex alternative. From
the borrower's viewpoint, the VRM has some potential advantages over
standard mortgages. If interest rates drop, monthly payments will be
reduced. In addition, many lenders price VRMs slightly below the prevailing standard rate, promise easy assumability, and eliminate or reduce prepayment penalties. 93 VRMs also may be more easily available
90. Cowan & Foley, supra note 89, at 129-30.
91. The increase in rates that would result is, of course, difficult to determine. Considering the recent erratic behavior of rates, most lenders would put a significant premium on
money loaned for twenty to thirty years without a due-on-sale clause. Professor Pratt has
suggested that a 25 year loan made in 1964 at 6% would have theoretically been loaned at
7% had the lender been able to foresee the future behavior of rates and not had the capability of enforcing the due-on-sale clause. Pratt Report, The Due on Sale Clause in California
and Federally Chartered Savings and Loan Associations 21 (1976) (on file with The Hastings
Law Journal).

92.
93.

See note 77 & accompanying text supra.
Cowan & Foley, supra note 89, at 125.
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94
than conventional financing in tight money markets.
Of course, if interest rates rise, the VRM will be more expensive
than fixed rate loans. For this reason, they are particularly attractive to
lenders as the risk of increasing costs is partially shifted to the boris still maintained berower.95 And if rates decline, the lender's yield
96
reduced.
been
has
also
funds
cause its cost of
By contrast, the fixed rate mortgage, with or without the due-onsale clause, offers borrowers the opportunity to lock in a rate for a fixed
period of time coinciding with their ownership. Should rates increase,
the borrower has made a good bargain. If they decline, refinancing is
still possible, the level at which it becomes profitable being dictated by
prepayment penalties and loan initiation fees.97 There can be little dispute, however, that VRMs are less expensive in a declining rate market. 98
The standard fixed rate loan containing a due-on-sale clause thus
provides a valuable option for particular borrowers. In fact, any borrower who expects rates to increase and intends to keep the property
for the duration of the loan surely must choose this option. Even if the
borrower did not intend to keep the property until maturity, he or she
still has the option of taking the risk that a VRM or interest-insurance
"cushion" loan ultimately will be more expensive than a standard fixed
rate loan with a due-on-sale provision. Considering the recent behavior of interest rates, that risk bears the image of a certainty.9 9
The supreme court surely was looking out for the interests of borrowers in stating that a restraint is not reasonable merely because of its
commercial benefit to the restrainor. The court, however, did not con-

94. Id.
95. There has been considerable debate over the issuance of VRMs. The chairman of
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board has argued that VRMs are needed to encourage greater
investment in mortgages and allow savings institutions to compete more successfully for
funds. He feels they will benefit the consumer by strengthening lenders' earnings. On the
other hand, a labor leader contends that VRMs are inflationary and unfair to the borrower.
Many builders believe VRMs will add to the cost of housing and one critic has called the
VRM "legal loan sharking." See Rocky Mountain News, Dec. 15, 1978, at 3; San Francisco
Chronicle, Dec. 15, 1978, at I. See generally BUSINESS WEEK, Oct. 16, 1978, at 173. Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court has stated that the VRM "has become an attractive
and viable alternative." Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.10,582 P.2d at
976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
96. There are several variations on the VRM. See generally THE ALTERNATIVE MORTGAGE INSTRUMENTS RESEARCH STUDY (D. Kaplan ed. 1977); see also Cowan & Foley,
supra note 89, at 123-29.
97. See note 78 supra.
98. See Cowan & Foley, supra note 89, at 129-30.
99. Thousands of VRM loans were increased an average of .2 of 1% in October, 1978.
BUSINESS WEEK, October 16, 1978, at 177. Rates were again increased from .2 to .25 of 1%
in April, 1979, and many analysts have predicted a similar round of increases in October,
1979 and a modest increase in April, 1980. Wall Street Journal, Feb. 22, 1979, at 24, col. 3.
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sider the commercial benefit of the due-on-sale clause to future borrowers. The majority's position throughout the decision presumed the
00 Yet paradoxicontinuance of rising interest rates and tighter money. i
0
cally, by effectively prohibiting due-on-sale clauses,' ' at least in residential financing, 0 2 the decision prevents borrowers from "beating
inflation" by locking in a fixed rate loan at current rates. Hence, past
borrowers will reap small gains from the assumability of their loans,
while present and future borrowers will pay increased costs as a result
of the decision handed down in Wellenkamp. There is, therefore, little
justification for the supreme court's failure to recognize portfolio adjustment as a legitimate reason for enforcement of the due-on-sale
clause.
The decision is also erroneous in asserting that "it [is] unjust to
place the burden of the lender's mistaken economic projections on
property owners .... ,"103 The lender has made no such mistaken projection; on the contrary, the rate chosen in a fixed rate mortgage containing a due-on-sale clause reflects not only current and projected
economic conditions but also the lender's assumption that it will recover the loan or adjust the rate upon sale of the mortgaged property.
If the lender had known the due-on-sale clause would be rendered
powerless, it would not have been willing to lend at the rate selected. 04
This proposition has been demonstrated0 5 by the behavior of lenders
subsequent to the Wellenkamp decision.1
There is a further contradiction between the decision and the ma100. This presumption was implied by the majority's comment that "[s]ellers of unencumbered real property have presumably benefited from lower interest rates in achieving
their position." 21 Cal. 3d at 951 n.7, 582 P.2d at 975, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 384. Justice Clark
termed the majority's presumption "completely gratuitous." Id. at 957 n.3, 582 P.2d at 979,
148 Cal. Rptr. at 388.
101. Hetland, After Wellenkamp, CAL. REAL EST., December 1978, at 40.
102. See notes 137-43 & accompanying text infra.
103. 21 Cal. 3d at 953, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
104. Gordon C. Luce, president of the California Savings & Loan League, recently
stated: "Surely, any loan officer who has been making fixed-rate, 30-year mortgages very
long would have deep concerns about [the court's] conclusions in light of the real world
impossibilities of projecting what conditions will be like even five years ahead, not to mention the economic climate which will exist 20 and 30 years in the future.. . . Faced with
such an array of imponderables, a prudent lender might very well simply throw up his hands
and decide against making a 30-year loan commitment at all, or arbitrarily establish a loan
rate higher than today's interest level." Los Angeles Times, Sept. 5, 1978, Pt. III, at 13, col.
2.
105. Many lenders are actively promoting VRMs as a substitute for fixed rate loans.
Some have gone so far as to stop committing for fixed rate loans on residences. Interview
with Edward S. Washburn, Legal Counsel to Great Western Savings & Loan Ass'n, Oakland, California (Feb. 12, 1979). At the same time, some lenders are now making fixed rate
mortgage loans at record high rates of up to 11 34% in California in the hope of locking in
those yields before rates decline. Wall Street Journal, July 2, 1979, at 34, col. 1.
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jority's presumption that rising interest rates and inflation will continue. Fixed rate loans not only enable borrowers to lock in a lower
rate, but also to pay back principal with inflated dollars. Certain
VRMs, depending on the type and index employed to trigger increases
or decreases in the interest rate, result in no such gain to the borrower;
instead, the borrower must pay for financing with "real," undiscounted
dollars. 106
Finally, the majority relied heavily upon the supposition that dueon-sale clauses historically were designed for the purpose of protecting
against impairment of the lender's security and not the risks of business.' 0 7 However, the historical purpose for which the clause was
designed is decidedly irrelevant to the issue of when its exercise is reasonable. Thus, the majority erred in failing to recognize the commercial benefits to consumers that arise from the availability of fixed rate
mortgages containing due-on-sale clauses. 08 In doing so it has placed
an additional burden on already hard-pressed homebuyers. Ironically,
lenders may be thankful for the decision: because all fare equally under Wellenkamp, each can concentrate on lending funds through
VRM's and short-term rollovers without fear of competition from fixed
rate mortgages.' 0 9
Limited Applicability
As noted previously, the decision in Wellenkamp is inapplicable to
lenders who, prior to the date the decision became final (September 25,
1978), had either enforced the due-on-sale clause, resulting in sale of
the property by foreclosure or in discharge of the accelerated debt, or
106. See Cowan & Foley, supra note 89, at 124-25, 130.
107. 21 Cal. 3d at 952, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
108. Both the Colorado and Tennessee Supreme Courts expressly validated enforcement
of the due-on-sale clause in 1973: "The variable interest rate option may reflect the trend in
the industry, but the 'dueon sale'provisionisprobablythe most advantageousprocedureto the
borrowingpublic...
"... We do not consider the motive of Midland in seeking to protect itself and the
borrower from the effects of inflationary or deflationary conditions in the money market to
be improper or unlawful." Malouffv. Midland Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 181 Colo.294, 30203, 509 P.2d 1240, 1245 (1973) (emphasis added).
"Finally analyzed, the situation here is simply that appellants can sell their property at
a higher price if they can sell it at the lower interest rate. The appellees under theircontract
have the right to insist upon the repayment of their loan in the event of sale, so that they can
relendthe money at an increasedinterestrate,andso maintaintheirsupply oflending money, at
the level oftheirpresentcost ofsuch money. In this situation, equity should not depart from
the law which requires it to enforce valid contracts and strike down the acceleration option
simply because its exercise will let the appellees, not the appellants, make the profit on the
interest rate occasioned by the increased cost of money." Gunther v. White, 489 S.W.2d 529,
532 (Tenn. 1973) (emphasis added).
109. But see notes 144-50 & accompanying text infra.
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waived enforcement in return for an agreement with the new buyer
modifying the existing financing. The importance of the stability of
real estate titles and the interest in preserving completed financing arrangements were given as rationales for this limitation to the holding. 0 There can be little argument that a retroactive decision would
have led to disastrous consequences for lenders. Presumably hundreds
of thousands of loan payoffs, modifications and foreclosures have taken
place premised on the lender's claim that the clause was enforceable. A
retroactive holding could have provoked litigation from the entire spectrum of those affected by enforcement of the clause.
These same consequences would not ensue from the application of
Wellenkamp to cases already pending when the decision was handed
down. Although the prospective effect of the decision does not adversely affect those borrowers or purchasers who fortunately extracted
stipulations from lenders preventing foreclosure during litigation, or
who were able to obtain injunctions, several litigants were unable to
convince the lower courts that an injunction should issue during appeal. As a result, the limited applicability of the decision apparently
prevents them from obtaining relief.
In her petition for rehearing, Wellenkamp asked the court to make
the decision retroactive to all cases then pending in lower state
courts."' The petition was denied without comment."1 2 This decision
seems patently unfair as it penalizes plaintiffs in pending cases for the
supreme court's choice of Wellenkamp as its showcase. Indeed, one
case initiated litigation before Wellenkamp." 3 Ironically, those lower
court decisions that correctly anticipated the outcome of Wellenkamp
and gave judgment to the borrower or purchaser may now have to be
overruled on the basis of the limited applicability provision.' 14
Awarding damages to foreclosed plaintiffs would neither interfere
110.

21 Cal. 3d at 954, 582 P.2d at 977, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 386.

111.

Petition for Rehearing at 4, Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21 Cal. 3d 943, 582

P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 378 (1978).
112. Chief Justice Bird and Justice Mosk voted to rehear the issue.
113. Medovoi v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, No. 46892 (2d Cal. Dist. Ct. App., Feb. 7,
1979). See notes 137-42 & accompanying text infra.

114.

For what appears to be a classic example of "stretching the law to its limit," con-

sider the plight of the plaintiff in Garfinkle v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 268, 577 P.2d 1013,
145 Cal. Rptr. 673 (1978). Ga ftnkle involved the constitutionality of non-judicial foreclosure in addition to the legality of automatic enforcement of the due-on-sale clause. The
court stated, in essence, that the due-on-sale issue would be resolved by Wellenkamp.
The day following the filing of the Wellenkamp decision (thirty days from filing must

elapse before the decision becomes final under court rules), Wells Fargo posted and published its notice of trustee's sale for September 22, two days before the Wellenkamp decision,
which had been filed on August 25, could become final. It thus sought to hold a "completed" foreclosure sale before Wellenkamp became final, resulting in a "title" not to be

disturbed on the theory that Wellenkamp would not apply for two more days.
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with the stability of real estate titles nor upset completed financing arrangements, the two interests cited by the court for invoking limited
applicability." 5 If not modified, this aspect of the decision will serve
only to exacerbate the unfairness of its impact; the great price to be
paid by future borrowers already has resulted in even less gain than
previously noted.
The Implications of Wellenkamp
Wellenkamp will have far reaching consequences in real estate
financing. Although an analysis at this stage is speculative, some
guarded predictions may be attempted. This section discusses four major areas considered especially sensitive to the decision.
l6
Enforcement of the Due-On-Sale Clause"
Many lenders are concerned with the question of when, if ever, the
due-on-sale clause will be enforceable. Professor John Hetland, a recognized authority on California real property law, recently suggested
Hetland, After Wellenkamp, CAL. REAL EsT., January 1979, at 38 [hereinafter cited as
January 1979 Hetland].
115. Professor Hetland has suggested that "the court's limitation on retroactivity is limited ... to truly finalize [sic] transactions, either goodfaith final transfers of title orflnal
agreements/ornew loans with new buyers [i e., agreements with the new buyer modifying the
preexisting financing], by lenders relying on what they honestly believed to be the law at the
time they acted." He adds that, because Wellenkamp simply announces what the law of
California has been since Tucker, it applies to anything which has occurred in the last four
years (except the good faith final foreclosure sale or new loan between buyer and lender).
January 1979 Hetland, supra note 114, at 38-39.
116. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2924.6 (West Supp. 1979) provides for statutory control over
acceleration in certain specific situations:
"(a) An obligee may not accelerate the maturity date of the principal and accrued
interest on any loan secured by a mortgage or deed of trust on residential real property
solely by reason of any one or more of the following transfers in the title to the real property:
(1) A transfer resulting from the death of an obligor where the transfer is to the
spouse who is also an obligor.
(2) A transfer by an obligor where the spouse becomes a coowner of the property.
(3) A transfer resulting from a decree of dissolution of the marriage or legal
separation or from a property settlement agreement incidental to such a decree which
requires the obligor to continue to make the loan payments by which a spouse who is an
obligor becomes the sole owner of the property.
(4) A transfer by an obligor or obligors into an inter vivos trust in which the obligor
or obligors are beneficiaries.
(5) Such real property or any portion thereof is made subject to a junior
encumbrance or lien.
(b) Any waiver of the provisions of this section by an obligor is void and
unenforceable and is contrary to public policy.
(c) For the purposes of this section, "residential real property" means any real
property which contains at least one but not more than four housing units.
(d) This act applies only to loans executed or refinanced on or after January 1, 1976."
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that "even with the most summary of adjudications . . . litigation by
which a creditor seeks to justify acceleration will probably rarely, if
ever, occur."' 7 As a practical matter, the lender's margin of safety (the
difference between the value of the security and the loan balance), even
if only twenty to thirty percent of the property's value, generally provides a sufficient amount of security to offset the threat posed by uncreditworthy purchasers.11 8 In fact, Hetland suggests that the
uncreditworthy purchaser "who truly has no funds and no ability to
pay doubtless will be in default" during the same period of time necessary to prove the risk to security for the purposes of Wellenkamp." 9
Even if the new borrower is on the verge of bankruptcy and the margin
of safety is slim, the lender may be better off in bankruptcy20proceedings
than in attempting to prove justification for acceleration.1
The result is that lenders will resort to acceleration only in the
"truly extraordinary, truly outrageous situation that [arises] perhaps
once in ten years." Furthermore, where serious waste may result from
the transfer, lenders may fare better by seeking appointment of a re2
ceiver, a remedy available even in the absence of monetary default.' '
Another commentator has conjectured that lenders who document
repeated instances of waste occurring in property previously owned or
occupied by the new borrower may succeed in carrying the burden of
proof.122 Likewise, the failure to answer requests for credit information
or the provision of false and misleading information also may constitute sufficient justification for acceleration. 123 In any event, those few
lenders who do attempt to prove justification face considerable
problems. Only future case law can remove the uncertainties that presently exist.
Applicability to "Private" Lenders
The court specifically restricted its holding to institutional lenders,
expressing no opinion on the question of whether a private lender, including a purchase-money lender, has interests which might "inherently" justify automatic enforcement of the clause. 24 One author has
117. January 1979 Hetland, supra note 114, at 40.
118. Tucker indicated that the risk of default must be "significantly enhanced" to provide sufficient justification. 12 Cal. 3d at 639, 526 P.2d at 1175, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
119. January 1979 Hetland, supra note 114, at 40.
120. Id.
121. Id. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 564 (West 1954).
122. See Goodman, The Wellenkamp Decision. How it Will Affect Real Estate Financing, 54 CAL. ST. B.J. 34, 38 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Goodman].
123. Id.
124. "In the instant case the party seeking enforcement of the due-on clause is an institu-

tional lender. We limit our holding accordingly. We express no present opinion on the
question whether a private lender, including the vendor who takes back secondary financ-
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suggested that, under some circumstances, a private lender has a more
compelling need for the protection of the due-on-sale clause. 125 A
a
seller who carries back part of the purchase price (and is therefore1 26
"private" lender) cannot obtain a deficiency judgment upon default.
On the other hand, institutional lenders may obtain deficiency judg27
ments if the property is non-owner occupied or more than four units.
It may seem fair, then, to grant those private lenders unable to obtain
deficiency judgments the right to automatically enforce the clause upon
sale. 128 However, Wellenkamp also involved a lender, albeit an institutional one, unable to seek a deficiency judgment. 2 9 One might expect
that had the court intended to limit Wellenkamp to those lenders not
entirely prohibited from obtaining deficiency judgments, it would have
been more explicit in its disclaimer.
The limited sophistication of the private lender may suggest a rationale for the court's action. Private lenders, unlike institutional lenders, generally are ill-equipped to spread risks and facilitate interest rate
adjustments. Moreover, the credit and personal backgrounds of prospective purchasers are more accessible to institutional lenders. 30 This
lack of sophistication arguably creates a greater need for automatic enforcement of the clause upon sale.
Professor Hetland proposed three further possible explanations for
the limitation. He first points out that the adhesion contract doctrine,
although not mentioned explicitly by the court, played an amorphous
but influential role in the decision.'31 Hetland concludes that the majority recognizes "the validity, in the context of a non-standard, nonadhesive, non-institutional format, of the right of parties with relatively
equal bargaining positions and intelligence to freely contract with one
32
another." 1
Secondly, the court's rejection of the portfolio adjustment argument should not, according to Hetland, preclude personal secured loan
arrangements between individuals, particularly in the family situation.
Similarly, the court's concern with adhesion contracts and portfolio ading, has interests which might inherently justify automatic enforcement of a due-on clause in
his favor upon resale." 21 Cal. 3d at 952 n.9, 582 P.2d at 976, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 385.
125. Goodman, supra note 122, at 38.
126. See note 74 supra.
127. Id.
128. Goodman, supra note 122, at 38.
129. The home in Wellenkamp was a dwelling for not more than four families. See note
74 supra.
130. See Goodman, supra note 122, at 38, 40.
131. The plaintiff did allege that the due-on-sale clause was unlawful based on adhesion
contract principles. The court did not discuss the merits of that argument. Whether such a
doctrine could be used to invalidate the clause is beyond the scope of this Note.
132. January 1979 Hetland, supra note 114, at 43.
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justment should not preclude "special purpose" loans, those made to
individual borrowers with special qualifications and customized to a
single transaction. These loans are essentially private even when en133
tered into by an institutional lender.
Finally, he suggests that the private lender exemption may ultimately reach all those lenders not exempt from California's usury limitations.' 34 The institutional lender, e.g., the commercial bank or
savings and loan association, is exempt from the ten percent usury limitation and therefore is capable of increasing interest income above that
level. On the other hand, private individuals, pension funds, small
businesses, and second mortgage brokers, among others, are locked
into returns of ten percent or less per annum. By placing non-exempt
lenders in the status of "private" lenders, they may be rendered capable
of participating in the high interest 135
markets without the impediment of
"non-liquid, non-reusable" funds.
These projections may be addressed and the correct interpretation of the private lender exemption
established by a case still pending in the supreme court, Guild Wineries
& Distilleries v. Land Dynamics,136 which involves acceleration by a
private party purchase-money lender.
Applicability to Non-Single-Family Dwellings
Professor Hetland has suggested that by deliberately characterizing the home in Wellenkamp as "a parcel of real property," the court
intended to apply the substantive principles of that case to commercial
as well as residential properties. 137 Many lenders, however, claim that
there is a valid distinction between the two classes of property, primarily based on the greater sophistication inherent in commercial transactions.
A recent decision found one court of appeal in substantial agreement. In Medovoi v. American Savings & Loan Association, 3 8 the court
133. Id. Hetland cites as an example the artist who borrows money to purchase a location. The lender has loaned the money on the basis of the artist's reputation. Should the
artist sell, the lender should have the right to call the loan since the absence of that individual may make the loan unreasonably risky.
134. CAL. CONST. art. XV, § 1.
135. January 1979 Hetland, supra note 114, at 43.
136. No. 23685 (Cal. Sup. Ct., filed Aug. 4, 1977).
In Demey v. Joujon-Roche, No. 48408 (2d Cal. Dist. Ct. App., Apr. 9, 1979), remanded
shortly after Wellenkamp, the court of appeal had the opportunity to discuss the private
lender exemption. Unfortunately, neither party discussed the exemption before the court so
the case was decided on other grounds. A petition for hearing before the supreme court was
denied on July 5, 1979.
137. January 1979 Hetland, supra note 114, at 41.
138. No. 46892 (2d Cal. Dist. Ct. App., Feb. 7, 1979). Medovoi concerned a complicated
fact situation involving an involuntary transfer (to the junior lienholder) and a subsequent
transfer by the non-assuming transferree.
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of appeal concluded that Wellenkamp does not apply "to commercial
property such as a multi-unit apartment building." The opinion views
Wellenkamp as limited to loans made39by institutional lenders on owner-occupied single-family residences.
More interesting, however, is the action taken by the supreme
court upon the plaintiff's petition for hearing in MedovoL The petition
was denied but, at the same time, the court ordered decertification of
the appellate opinion. 140 The effect of this is unclear. Medovoi was
decided in the appellate court on two independent grounds, the other
being that Wellenkamp is not applicable to transfers by non-assuming
transferees. Possibly, the supreme court approved of the court's holding in the particular fact situation of Medovoi without agreeing with the
rationale adopted in reaching the decision. 14 1 In any case, this most
recent action of the supreme court has done little to dispel the uncertainty surrounding Wellenkamp. 142
Notwithstanding Medovol, there are cogent arguments on both
sides of the question of whether Wellenkamp applies to non-residential
properties. Those in favor of retaining automatic enforcement contend
that because more negotiation takes place in the commercial setting,
less weight should be attached to the concern that there has been an
unfair bargain. Those who favor adopting a Wellenkamp standard suggest instead that even greater restraint may occur in the commercial
transaction because prospective purchasers pay much closer attention
to economics than do homebuyers. The commercial purchaser reacts
more sharply to the economic effect of the due-on-sale clause because
he or she is interested primarily in return on investment and not, as is
the homebuyer, in aesthetics.143 As of yet, there is no substantial authority for either of these positions. An opinion by the supreme court
covering a commercial situation will be necessary to determine the extent of Wellenkamp. Until then, lenders and borrowers alike are left
with little guidance for the future.
139. Id.
140. The supreme court took its action on April 19, 1979. On the uncertain effect of
decertification, see Biggs, Censoringthe Law in Caiffornia: DecertifcationRevisited, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1577 (1979).
141. Regarding the commerical property exception to Wellenkamp, the Medovoi court
based its decision on what was perceived to be the policy behind Wellenkamp: protection of
the homeowner's equity. Citing numerous statutes as evidence, it pointed out that the Legislature has frequently singled out owner-occupied residences for special attention and protection, noting that the supreme court also made mention of this policy.
142. Another reason for decertification may be that the supreme court disapproved of
language critical of Welenkamp found in a footnote to Medovoi. In that footnote Judge
Hanson went to great lengths to express reservations about the supreme court's action in
Wellenkamp.
143. See notes 56-58 & accompanying text supra.
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Federal Preemption

After the decision in Tucker, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
(FHLBB) issued a resolution indicating that federally-chartered savings and loan associations were empowered to enforce the due-on-sale
clause notwithstanding California law.44 Federal regulations were enacted on June 8, 1976, restricting the circumstances in which lenders
could enforce the clause. 145 In the recent case of Glendale FederalSavings & Loan Association v. Fox, 14 6 the federal district court granted a
partial summary judgment for the federally-chartered plaintiff, declaring that federal regulations exclusively govern the validity and exercisability of due-on-sale clauses in loan instruments executed by
federal associations on or after June 8, 1976.147 The effect of the decision is to allow federal associations the right to continue48loaning on a
fixed-rate basis with an enforceable due-on-sale clause.'
It is too early to measure the combined effect of Wellenkamp, Glendale FederalSavings, and the FHLBB's recent decision allowing federally-chartered savings and loan associations to offer the VRM (in
California only). Federal restrictions on the VRM make it less competitive and more difficult to offer than the state regulated VRM. 149 Ostensibly, however, a chasm has developed between regulated lenders,
and unfair competition may result.1 50
144. Resolution No. 75-647, FED. HOME LOAN BANK BOARD (1975).
145. 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11(f)-(g) (1978).
146. No. CIV 77-3274-WMB (C.D. Cal. 1978).
147. No. CIV 77-3274-WMB (C.D. Cal. 1978) (order granting partial summary judgment). Judge Byrne did not decide whether the Bank Board preempted state law with respect to loans executed before June 8, 1976.
148. Another case challenging the federally-chartered institution's right to enforce the
due-on-sale clause is pending in the state court. People v. Glendale Federal Say. & Loan
Ass'n, No. C147921 (L.A. Super. Ct., June 14, 1976). The central issue in both cases is
whether Congress has manifested an intention to "preempt the field"; that is, did Congress
empower the Federal Home Loan Bank Board to regulate enforcement of the clause. An
analysis of this complex constitutional issue is beyond the scope of this Note. However, it
should be noted that an Oregon Supreme Court case now pending in the United States
Supreme Court may resolve the issue. Although the case involves interest on impounded
funds, the situation is sufficiently analogous to the due-on-sale cases pending in California
to provide guidance. Benjamin Franklin Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Derenco, Inc. (petition
for cert. pending, U.S. Supreme Court No. 77-1694).
149. Federally-chartered lenders are required to offer an alternative fixed rate loan as
well as present a "worst case" pro forma to borrowers, demonstrating the effect of a maximum increase in rates ( % per year). See 43 Fed. Reg. 59,336 (1978) (to be codified at 12
C.F.R. §§ 545.6-1-545.6-2).
150. For a recent discussion of federal preemption in this area, see Hetland, After Wellenkamp." Are Mutuals Bound by Law?, 59 CAL. REAL EST., February, 1979, at 16. Hetland
suggests that federally chartered lenders are subject to Wellenkamp primarily because the
entire transaction is otherwise governed by California law and involves California residents
repaying loans on property located within the state. He does not feel Congress has empow-
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Conclusion
The Wellenkamp decision, in rendering the due-on-sale clause
powerless, has done a disservice to borrowers. By refusing to recognize
its benefits to the borrowing public, the supreme court has choked off
the availability of fixed rate mortgages, leaving prospective
homebuyers with variable rate mortgages and short-term rollovers,
neither of which provides complete protection in an inflationary economy. The result is that homebuyers may no longer be able to lock in
reasonable rate loans payable with inflated dollars.
Pro-consumer decisions occasionally backfire. Because the
supreme court has refused to hear Medovol, future cases must determine the limits of Wellenkamp. This Note urges that these cases, and
perhaps legislation,1 5 ' be used to amend and limit the potentially adverse effects of Wellenkamp.

ered the Bank Board with the right to regulate this question. Hetland further suggests that
federal authorization of VRMs increases the possibility of the courts subjecting all lenders
equally to Wellenkamp. Id. at 17, 19.
151. A.B. 748 (1979) was introduced in and subsequently withdrawn from the California
State Legislature for the purpose of limiting Wellenkamp. The bill, which would have applied to all real estate loans made after January 1, 1980, would have allowed lenders to offer
new borrowers a choice between a nonassumable loan which could not be passed on to a
new buyer, or an assumable loan at a higher rate. The interest rate could be up to one
percentage point higher, or the term of the loan as much as five years shorter, for an assumable loan. The bill may be reintroduced in the present session of the legislature.

